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ABSTRACT 
 
The ideas of centralized political power and monarchy that 
emerged from the Mediterranean world are among the most 
important philosophical bases for the concept of sovereignty. My 
thesis is that the normative idea of an absolute, independent, and 
exclusive center of power originates in a complex case of 
philosophical hybridity. It is the outcome of the alternation 
between the conception of the Sovereign as representing the 
supreme power (the indirect theory) and the conception of the 
Sovereign as directly containing that power (the direct theory). The 
former conception is usually associated with the history of Western 
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political culture and the passage from Greek to Roman ideas of 
public authority. The latter conception is typically associated with 
the understanding of supreme political power found in Eastern 
culture, as exemplified in Persian kingship and the Byzantine 
theocracy.  
My intention is to show how the modern concept of 
sovereignty has emerged from a mixture of these two conceptions. 
In fact, the early philosophical structure of sovereignty in both its 
monarchical and its democratic versions can be summed up in the 
notion of secularized transcendence. The sovereign benefits 
simultaneously from both the conceptual model of subjectivity (the 
indirect theory) as a mask that represents a center of attribution (le 
Roi est mort, vive le Roi), and the conceptual model of a material 
supreme subject (the direct theory) who embodies the primacy of 
an authority that is beyond actual social relationships (l’État c’est 
moi). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
My thesis is that the normative idea of sovereignty, that is, 
of an absolute, independent, and exclusive center of power, is a 
complex instance of philosophical and cultural hybridity. It 
constitutes a specific kind of mixture whose nature seems obvious 
in the complex transition from pre-modernity to modernity but that 
is clearly freighted with the multiple nature of the millennia-long 
historical experience of Mediterranean life. 
This thesis does not challenge the widespread conception of 
sovereignty as a typical legal-political category of modernity. That 
conception is not at issue in my analysis. In fact, it is precisely 
from the perspective of a philosophical discontinuity in the concept 
of sovereignty that it becomes possible to grasp the unique mixture 
of ancient and modern features to be found in new ways of 
theorizing supreme legal and political power. In tracing this 
conceptual history, we need to adopt a specific approach that seeks 
to identify the area of convergence where past concepts are 
subsumed into and transformed by modern concepts. This 
approach entails taking account of both the rupturing impact on 
culture and society of new principles and the presence of traces of 
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past attitudes in the formation of new styles of life and thought.1 
Thus I am not questioning the need to interpret and understand the 
concept of sovereignty in a holistic way, that is, by taking into 
consideration the network of social, historical, political, and 
cultural features that frame modernity.  
At first glance, the conception of sovereignty in the 
Mediterranean region seems to consist of a temporal-spatial mosaic 
of interdependent elements that compose a single conceptual 
structure: that of a transcendent, absolute power intended to further 
human well-being. The modern European attitude towards 
centralized power would appear to derive from this structure, even 
when we take account of the indisputable differences between 
Eastern and Western conceptions of power. The point is that the 
cultural mobility that has always been a feature of the 
Mediterranean region allowed for numerous intersections and 
cases of intermingling between Eastern and Western cultures in a 
way that was decisive for the development of the concept of 
sovereignty. 
 
II. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
From a historical perspective, an illuminating picture of 
this process of hybridization, specifically relevant to the 
development of the concept of sovereignty, is provided by the 
relationship between the theocratic autocracies established in the 
Egyptian and Persian empires and the structure adopted by the 
Roman Empire in the fourth century.2 As Mommsen observed, 
Roman imperial power was based at this time on the model of the 
Eastern Hellenistic monarchies. By means of this new model, 
                                                                                                             
1.  See REINHART KOSELLECK, VERGANGENE ZUKUNFT: ZUR SEMANTIK 
GESCHICHTLICHER ZEITEN (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1979). 
2. Groundbreaking work on this process of hybridization, including the 
presentation of precise data, can be found in Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Black 
Gaius: A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of the “Western Legal Tradition”, 
51.3 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (2000). See also Dionysios Zakythinos, Processus de 
Féodalisation, 2 L'HELLÉNISME CONTEMPORAIN 499 (1948); D. ZAKYTHINOS, 
BYZANCE: ETAT-SOCIÉTÉ-ECONOMIE (Variorum, London, 1973); SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN BYZANTIUM FROM JUSTINIAN I TO THE LAST 
PALAEOLOGUS: PASSAGES FROM BYZANTINE WRITERS AND DOCUMENTS (Ernest 
Barker ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1957). 
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imperial dignity had been sacralized. The emperor was no longer 
primus inter pares but rather a distant and holy person. He was 
viewed as a divinity that was to be honored; and then, following 
Constantine’s reform, as a person representing the divinity.3  
These Hellenistic political models that so strongly 
influenced the Eastern Roman Empire and thus the complex 
process of formation of the Byzantine Empire had of course in turn 
been based on Alexander the Great’s celebrated conquest of the 
Persian and Egyptian empires and thus they incorporated a mixture 
of Greek, Egyptian, and Persian political and cultural 
characteristics. In Alexander’s project and in his political praxis, 
the intention was evident of combining Greek political models 
with elements of a pronounced Eastern character. Alexander was 
attracted in particular by the sacralized conception of the topmost 
political figures in Eastern culture.  
From this Mediterranean dynamic of the interaction 
between legal and political power, the conception of the governor 
as Deus et Dominus and the establishment of a vast bureaucratic 
apparatus emerged as salient in the most significant political 
entities of the region. As well, the cult of the emperor was 
established, along with the organization of a system of officialdom 
closely linked to the source of power. Finally, this conception of 
the sovereign appears to have been systematically transmitted 
through the Byzantine interpretation of imperial divinity and was 
maintained (of course in Christian terms) even following the 
Christianization of the Empire. 
Thus in this conception, the emperor, by virtue of his 
dignity, is understood to stand above all other people as the 
imitation of God. He is God’s shadow on Earth. He is invested 
with a majesty of divine origin. He is not just a representative of 
the supreme power, but an intermediate figure between God and 
humans who participates in the nature of the holy. He is the God of 
the World. Indeed, the emperor’s holiness and Christ’s divinity are 
strongly connected. Numerous imperial rites and ceremonies of 
Byzantine society evince the practice of a sort of 
                                                                                                             
3. See 1-2 FRANTISEK DVORNIK, EARLY CHRISTIAN AND BYZANTINE 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND (Dumbarton Oaks, 
Washington, 1966). 
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“Christomimesis.” Thus the common unifying feature of the most 
significant (in terms of extension in time and relevance to 
modernity) Mediterranean political experience, an experience that 
did not come to a formal end until 1453, was that of a relationship 
between politics and transcendence: a legitimizing relationship 
ensured by the role of a holy emperor conceived of as a figure with 
direct contact with the transcendent.4 
This feature is closely linked to a belief shared by the 
Byzantines with other peoples of the Mediterranean region, namely 
that their community in some manner constituted a divine 
manifestation, a theophany.5 In a framework of this kind, a highly 
important notion is that of the center; that is, the idea of the 
supreme city as the center of the world where the point of contact 
with the transcendent is located.  
 
III. THE HOLINESS OF THE POLITICAL 
 
We are dealing, then, with the question of the relationship 
between politics, law, and the dimension of the holy. Within this 
framework, the concept of the “holy” is equivalent to the meaning 
of a productive social ritual that is never totally subjective, since its 
orientation depends on its relationship with the transcendent. In 
this sense, the dimension of the holy is the sphere in which 
mechanisms of collective and symbolic identification unfold. It is a 
foundational dimension for the “political,” since we find in it 
original and unchanging dynamics of inclusion/exclusion. We are 
dealing with a kind of process of political consecration that is in a 
sense very close to Émile Durkheim’s notion of the “holy.” For 
Durkheim, the holy stands for a collective representation that 
makes it possible to order, and thus constitute, reality. This 
representation is a sociocultural datum that allows individuals to 
transcend themselves by virtue of their identification with the 
group. Thus the symbolic separation of the “holy” from the 
                                                                                                             
4. For an insightful overview of the relationship between holiness and 
political power in Christian Europe, see ADVENIAT REGNUM: LA REGALITÀ 
SACRA DELL'EUROPA CRISTIANA (Franco Cardini & Maria Saltarelli eds., Name, 
Genova, 2000). 
5. See HÉLÉNE AHRWEILER, L'IDÉOLOGIE POLITIQUE DE L'EMPIRE 
BYZANTIN (PUF, Paris, 1975). 
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“profane,” deriving from humankind’s original socio-religious 
attitude, is the original operation of social classification.6   
And indeed, symbolic function is integral to sacrificial 
experience, both in original true sacrifices and in subsequent 
developments in which a purely linguistic ceremony prevails over 
the physical aspects of the ritual. What is at issue here is the 
symbolization of the community’s political and social origins 
through its link with the principle of the transcendent. But this 
reality is the product of a cultural process of social institution that, 
by consecrating a “place,” sanctions a difference between the real 
and the unreal, the human and the non-human. Pierre Bourdieu’s 
analysis of the meaning of consecrating rituals as legitimizing 
rituals of a social reality is precisely relevant here. According to 
Bourdieu, in rituals of consecration we are dealing with institutive 
rituals of sociality, that is, with rituals that lead to the recognition 
as legitimate and natural of a difference that is in fact arbitrary. 
From this perspective, the sacralization of a space and of a leader 
within this space is an institutive ritual of sociality because it 
simultaneously establishes and consecrates a difference. 
Thus the institution of society is an operation of attribution 
of properties to places, persons, actions, behaviors, and objects in a 
way that makes it possible to perceive these properties as 
something natural. What is communicated and represented, and 
therefore perceived, as the manifestation of the holy (theophany) is 
precisely a political and legal order interpreted as the product of a 
consecrating separation: “To institute, in this case, is to consecrate, 
that is, to sanction and sanctify a particular state of things, an 
established order, in exactly the same way that a constitution does 
in the legal and political sense of the term.”7 
 
                                                                                                             
6. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, LES FORMES ÉLÉMENTAIRES DE LA VIE 
RELIGIEUSE (PUF, Paris, 1968) (1912). 
7. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 119 (John 
Thompson ed., G. Raymond & M. Adamson trans., Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1993). The original version is in PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGAGE ET 
POUVOIR SYMBOLIQUE 177 (Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2001) (1993) (“Instituer, en 
ce cas, c’est consacrer, c’est-à-dire sanctionner et sanctifier un état de choses, un 
ordre établi, comme fait, précisément, une constitution au sens juridico-politique 
du terme.”). 
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IV. THE MODERN CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
What is really surprising, given the flux of change one 
finds in the history of ideas and cultures, is the reappearance at the 
end of the sixteenth century of extremely centralized organizations 
of political power, in contrast to the chaotic plurality of legal and 
political centers of power typical of the Middle Ages. This 
reappearance is especially surprising in its implicit assumption and 
positioning of a “holy” subject that transcends social reality for the 
purpose of governing it. In conceptual terms, this subject stands for 
the core of a single, central political and legal power. Thus from 
this perspective, the idea of an absolute, exclusive, and 
independent power, embodied in the institutional figure of the 
sovereign as the core of the modern state, shows the implicit 
persistence of a structural conception of supreme power. It is a 
conception in which, as we will see, the relationship between 
politics and the transcendent continues to figure; but this 
relationship has changed in significant ways and now emerges as a 
bare conceptual model fully contextualized within the complex 
turn of the modern.  
It is widely recognized that the crisis of the medieval order 
is visible in the process of the formation of modern states. 
According to historiography convention, the Peace of Westphalia 
of 1648 is emblematic of this epochal political and legal 
transformation.8 What is crucially relevant to the thesis of the 
present article is the celebrated reaffirmation in the texts of the 
Peace of Westphalia of the principle of cuius regio, eius et religio, 
which had been established in 1555 in the Peace of Augsburg. This 
principle enshrines the link between an individual’s authority over 
a region (including over a kingdom) and that individual’s religious 
faith: the latter automatically becomes the state religion. Thus we 
have here the establishment of a link between territory and the 
cultural identity of a people that is forming itself as a nation under 
the exclusive and independent direction of a unique authority. 
                                                                                                             
8. The literature on the Peace of Westphalia is of course vast. For a 
systematic but also unconventional conceptual approach, see PEACE TREATIES 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE 
AGES TO WORLD WAR ONE (Randall Lesaffer ed., Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004). 
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Within this set of interconnections that link territorial, political, 
and cultural-religious elements, we grasp the existence of the 
nucleus of sovereignty as the expression of the modern conception 
of political authority.   
The feudal lord becomes sovereign in the territory that 
belongs to him. Within this framework, he accedes to the status of 
the one who has no superior. Thus the sovereign exercises his 
power superiorem non recognoscens. His authority is exclusive, 
since there is no possibility for the exercise of a legitimate power 
that, within a specific territory, is not subject to the sovereign’s 
will. But further, his authority is also independent of that of other 
sovereigns who symmetrically exercise their own power over 
specific populations and territories. 
It can thus be affirmed that post-Westphalia European 
society was composed of a plurality of territorially based political 
systems. Each of these systems had a supreme and independent 
governing authority. The medieval political-theological universitas 
now acquired the nature of an international societas of sovereign 
states. Sovereign power emerged from the intersections and 
complex links among political and normative centers that had been 
typical of the Middle Ages. Thus the sovereign state, at any rate in 
ideal terms, neutralized the medieval system of dispersed powers 
and established a centralizing authority. The population governed 
by the sovereign had the duty to obey the laws he enacted; and the 
possibility of external interference by presumptively superior 
authorities, like the pope and the emperor, were in principle 
eliminated: rex est imperator in regno suo.  
An important example of the modern theory of sovereignty 
that nevertheless reveals significant traces of its medieval origins is  
Jean Bodin’s Les six livres de la République (1576).9 Bodin 
advances an original notion of absolute power (ab-solutus, that is, 
without constraints). On one hand, absoluteness is to be confined 
                                                                                                             
9. For overviews of Bodin’s thought, see ROGER CHAUVIRÉ, JEAN BODIN 
AUTEUR DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (Champion, Paris, 1914); SIMONE GOYARD-FABRE, 
J. BODIN ET LE DROIT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (PUF, Paris, 1986); Julian H. 
FRANKLIN, J. BODIN AND THE RISE OF ABSOLUTIST THEORY (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1973); DIEGO QUAGLIONI, I LIMITI DELLA 
SOVRANITÀ: IL PENSIERO DI J. BODIN NELLA CULTURA POLITICA E GIURIDICA 
DELL'ETÀ MODERNA (Cedam, Padova, 1992). 
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to the exercise of political-legal power in the sense of the 
sovereign’s positive statutes. This means the absoluteness does not 
equate to power without limits, for the sovereign must respect 
God’s laws. On the other hand, Bodin’s intention is not to set 
factual limits on sovereign political power. Rather he wishes to 
preserve the normative value of the idea of “nature” as a horizon 
within which the rationality of sovereign power is to be confined. 
The measure of nature provides the foundation for the rationality 
of political power and thus the rationality of absoluteness as its 
inescapable prerogative. The conceptual supremacy of the 
sovereign is rationally justified by the absolute transcendence of 
the “natural” order. Interpreting Bodin’s thought, we might say 
that, in the modern “natural” world of equal individual subjects, a 
purely sovereign power finds its foundations in the rational idea of 
an absolute (and so “unequal”) center of power that, by virtue of its 
“inequality,” can serve as a legitimate authority over its subjects: 
“Similarly sovereign power given to a prince charged with 
conditions is neither properly sovereign, nor absolute, unless the 
conditions of appointment are only such as are inherent in the laws 
of God and of nature.”10 
Thus it is understandable that Bodin should arrive at this 
famous definition of sovereignty: “Sovereignty is that absolute and 
perpetual power vested in a commonwealth.”11 Under this 
conception, absoluteness coincides with the uniqueness of the 
political-legal source represented by the sovereign. Its perpetual 
nature is evident in the new prerogative assigned to sovereign 
power in modernity, namely exclusive competence to enact laws. 
Bodin situates the specific function of a sovereign subject in the 
concrete establishment of a normative order. The sovereign is 
                                                                                                             
10.   JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (J. M. Tooley 
trans., Basil Blackwell 1955) (1576), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/bodin/bodin.txt (Last visited October 24, 2011).  
The original version is in J. BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 89 
(Reproduction of the Paris Edition by Jacques du Puys, BNF, Gallica, 1581-
1583) (1576) (“Aussi la souveraineté donnée à un Prince sous charges & 
conditions, n’est pas proprement souveraineté, ny puissance absolue: si ce n’est 
que les conditions apposées en la création du Prince, soyent de la loy de Dieu ou 
de nature.”). 
11.   Id. The original version is in J. BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE 85 (1576) (“La souveraineté est la puissance absolue et perpétuelle 
d’une République.”).  
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justified and legitimized before his modern subjects by virtue of 
his ability to deal rationally with the need for coexistence and 
within the framework provided by God’s laws.   
Another (perhaps more radical) instance of the 
development of the modern concept of sovereignty that–
notwithstanding its disruptive assumptions and outcomes–features 
traces of a shared heritage with the Mediterranean tradition of 
absolute power is found in the theory Thomas Hobbes set out in 
Leviathan in 1651.12 
According to Hobbes, the natural condition of equality 
between people is an essential condition of subjectivity. The 
anthropology of conflict advanced by Hobbes derives from this 
radically modern starting point:  
Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of 
the body, and mind; as that though there be found 
one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or 
of quicker mind than another; yet when all is 
reckoned together, the difference between man, and 
man, is not so considerable, as that one man can 
thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which 
another may not pretend, as well as he.13  
Hobbes’ anthropology, relying for its starting point on the 
metaphorical-transcendent notion of the state of nature, may be 
represented (if perhaps somewhat simplistically) in the form of this 
strict logical sequence: equality of individuals => equality of hope 
=> possibility of convergent desires for the same goods => mutual 
diffidence => war of all against all as outcome of a strategy of 
anticipation => consequent generalized condition of brutishness 
and isolation. 
According to Hobbes, anthropologically, the neutralization 
of this endemic conflict in a pre-legal and pre-institutional context 
can be guaranteed simply by an internal solution within the 
                                                                                                             
12.   From among the many works that deserve mention, I recommend for 
general accounts of Hobbes’ life and ideas, RICHARD TUCK, HOBBES (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford-New York, 1989); and NORBERTO BOBBIO, THOMAS 
HOBBES (Einaudi , Torino, 2004) (1989).  
13.   THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER 
OF A COMMON-WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 82 (J.C.A Gaskin ed., 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) (1651). 
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dynamics of the conflict. The conflict itself will select a subject 
that has attained, even if only temporarily, to a power that 
overcomes all other subjective powers and is thus feared by 
everyone. But in order to exploit this precarious situation to obtain 
peace before the decline that is inescapable for any temporary 
superior power, a stabilizing step is necessary. This stabilization 
may be guaranteed by the institutionalization of this 
anthropologically based hierarchy. In particular, a stable context is 
achievable by means of legal tools (covenants) likely to make 
permanent the excess of power of a given subject who, being 
feared by all, will be capable of ensuring the peace. Thus the 
pactum unionis is also a pactum subjectionis to a subject who is 
invested with the power of all the individuals and who thus 
becomes the most powerful among them. This makes possible the 
transition from the precarious state of nature to a stable and 
permanent civil society.  
This transition performs its function simply through the 
dynamic of representation in which is crystallized the idea of a 
sovereign subject who transcends the multitude of people 
represented and who is conceived of as an external center of unity 
and as himself the condition for unity:  
A multitude of men, are made one person, when 
they are by one man, or one person, represented; so 
that it be done with the consent of every one of that 
multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the 
representer, not the unity of the represented, that 
maketh the person one. And it is the representer that 
beareth the person, and but one person: and unity, 
cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.14  
Thus from a logical-temporal perspective, the covenants are not 
divisible, since the members of the multitude are associated with 
each other by virtue of the fact that they are subject to the same 
institutional person who performs a representative function. 
Representation, as legal form, frames the nuclear structure of the 
Hobbesian state and the Hobbesian concept of sovereignty.15 The 
                                                                                                             
14.   Id. at 109. 
15.   The literature on the concept of representation in Hobbesian thought is 
vast. To mention just a few insightful interpretations: YVES-CHARLES ZARKA, 
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sovereign power, whose institutional end is individuals’ safety, is 
legally justified by means of a reciprocal authorization exchanged 
by subjects uti singuli: 
I authorize and give up my right of governing 
myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on 
this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, 
and authorize all his actions in like manner. This 
done, the multitude so united in one person, is 
called COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS.16 
Thus the sovereign stands in an external position with respect to 
the covenant. He is a third party who benefits from individuals’ 
authorizations. The subjects are the authors of the sovereign’s 
action. The sovereign is the actor who acts in the name of the 
multitude of people. The sovereign’s absoluteness is the outcome 
of the totalizing authorization derived from the subjects’ will. The 
sole effective limit on the sovereign is imposed by the purpose of 
his having been constituted, that is, by the guarantee of a peaceful 
social order. But at the end of the day, the effective ability of the 
sovereign to maintain the peace is not a limitation on the exercise 
of legal-political power. It is precisely the cause of the sovereign’s 
existence, and when he can no longer guarantee the peace he 
concretely loses the quality of sovereign. This means that 
conceptually the Hobbesian sovereign is substantially absolute. He 
is really a third party superiorem non recognoscens. He materially 
transcends the multitude, since he stands outside the social 
contract; and he symbolically transcends the multitude as well, 
                                                                                                             
 
HOBBES ET LA PENSÉE POLITIQUE MODERNE (PUF, Paris, 1995); Y. C. ZARKA, 
LA DÉCISION MÉTAPHYSIQUE DE HOBBES. CONDITIONS DE LA POLITIQUE (Vrin, 
Paris, 1999); RAYMOND POLIN, POLITIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIE CHEZ HOBBES (Vrin, 
Paris, 1977); DAVID P. GAUTHIER, THE LOGIC OF LEVIATHAN (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1969); CARL SCHMITT, DER LEVIATHAN IN DER STAATSLEHRE DES 
THOMAAS HOBBES. SINN UND FEHLSCHLAG EINES POLITISCHEN SYMBOL 
(Hohenheim verlag, Köln-Lövenich, 1982) (1938); LUCIEN JAUME, HOBBES ET 
L’ETAT REPRÉSENTATIF MODERNE (PUF, Paris, 1986); FRANCESCO VIOLA 
BEHEMOTH O LEVIATHAN? DIRITTO E OBBLIGO NEL PENSIERO DI HOBBES, 
(Giuffrè, Milano, 1979); GIUSEPPE SORGI, QUALE HOBBES? DALLA PAURA ALLA 
RAPPRESENTANZA (Franco Angeli, Milano, 1989); ADALGISO AMENDOLA, IL 
SOVRANO E LA MASCHERA. SAGGIO SUL CONCETTO DI PERSONA IN THOMAS 
HOBBES (Esi, Napoli, 1998). 
16.   HOBBES, supra note 13, at 114. 
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since he embodies its unity: he is “above” the plurality of the 
singularities that compose the multitude.  
Thus the modern form of political representation as 
conceived by Hobbes serves as the condition for thinking about the 
unity of a collective body. It does not consist in the representation 
of different organizations, social bodies, or parties; it is, rather, the 
embodiment of the idea of a people and of its unity made possible 
solely by virtue of representation by one person. This unity 
acquires its form, its visibility, because of the representative action 
of the sovereign. Modern political representation, so conceived, 
has a productive and formative nature: it makes visible and present 
something that is invisible and absent (a people and its unity) 
through the presence of a public (representative) entity. As Carl 
Schmitt has said, the dialectical nature of the concept of 
representation resides in the fact that the invisible being is 
presupposed to be absent and yet at the same time made present.17 
The invisible entity of reference, which seems so crucial to 
understanding the epochal political-legal meaning of the concept of 
sovereignty in modernity, indicates in a specific way the idea of 
openness to transcendence that we earlier described as the main 
Mediterranean legacy in our model of a supreme and absolute 
power. Thus what emerges from the modern concept of 
sovereignty, as well as from the significant role of the notion of 
representation within it, is a specific function filled by conceptual 
transcendence in order to constitute the political and legal order. 
The unity in the multitude that constitutes the crucial political 
question of modernity requires a transcendent movement from 
empirical reality. This movement is conceptually unresolved, since 
the ideal nature of the unity of a people is inescapable and is 
always ideal (absent) even when it is made present by virtue of the 
political representation of the sovereign. 
                                                                                                             
17.   See CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE (Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin, 1928). Discussing the conceptual structure of political-legal 
representation see also HASSO HOFMANN, REPRÄSENTATION. STUDIEN ZUR 
WORT- UND BEGRIFFSGESCHICHTE VON DER ANTIKE BIS INS 19. JAHRHUNDERT 
(Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1998); GIUSEPPE DUSO, LA RAPPRESENTANZA: UN 
PROBLEMA DI FILOSOFIA POLITICA (Giuffrè, Milano, 1998); GIOVANNI MAGRÌ, 
DAL VOLTO ALLA MASCHERA. LA REPRÄSENTATION NEL DIALOGO TRA GUARDINI 
E SCHMITT (Scriptaweb, Napoli, 2010); G. MAGRÌ, LA LEGGE DELLA FORMA. LA 
SCIENZA DEL DIRITTO DI CARL SCHMITT (Scriptaweb, Napoli, 2010). 
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V. SECULARIZED TRANSCENDENCE 
 
Given the conceptual outcome arrived at in the last 
paragraph, we should now specify and clarify the Mediterranean 
legacy in the concept of sovereignty with a reading of the 
relationship between legal-political power and conceptual 
transcendence. As Bertrand de Jouvenel has written, there is 
nothing less natural than that concentration of authority that makes 
authority distant and invisible.18 A certain aptitude for the mystical 
that has historically been weak in the West is needed to grasp the 
relevance of this concentration; or failing that, the clear presence 
of a dash of belief in the holy. Indeed, the mix of Eastern traditions 
of the sacred core of political power with the proto-secularized 
understanding of authority typical of Greek and Roman culture 
may be seen as one of the cultural conditions for possibility for the 
vast process of political unification effected by the establishment 
of the state in modernity.  
From this perspective, early modern literary descriptions of 
political power are significant. The political and existential 
representation of the sovereign found in Rosencrantz’s speech in 
Act III, Scene iii, of Shakespeare’s Hamlet seems to indicate a 
proto-modern centrality of the sovereign, of his soul in relation to 
the world around him. Like “a massy wheel / Fix’d on the summit 
of the highest mount / To whose huge spokes ten thousand lesser 
things / Are mortis’d and adjoin’d,” he is at the center of 
everything and has innumerable people attached to him, their 
destinies attached to his destiny.19 The fall of the sovereign is the 
fall of a world. This use of the form of the wheel and of the idea of 
the center as represented in the sovereign’s soul points to the 
unifying capacity of sovereignty when viewed, in modernity, as the 
locus of political unity.   
The persistence of the symbolism of the center of the 
world, then, is highly relevant to an understanding of the modern 
face of the sociopolitical, within which the concept of sovereignty 
is framed. But how are we to understand the meaning of this 
                                                                                                             
18.   BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ (Genin, Paris, 1955). 
19.   WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act III, sc. 
III, (1600-1602). 
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persistence? How are we to understand this symbolism, given the 
cultural horizons of an age that has emerged out of a gradual 
process of secularization? Perhaps we need to recall the cultural 
and philosophical core meaning of the concept of sovereignty as it 
appeared in the era of the Peace of Westphalia and in the theories 
of Bodin and, above all, Hobbes.    
The point is to grasp that, from a conceptual perspective, 
the logic that governs processes of political sacralization expresses 
the institution of a difference, of a distinguishing feature. On one 
hand, the process of legitimizing political authority in modernity is 
founded on the gradual establishment of a self-sufficient 
humanism;20 on the other hand, it emphasizes the need to institute 
a new order: an artificial order built by human beings as a creation 
ex nihilo. But as we have seen, the institution of an order is the 
institution of a difference in relation to the previous chaotic and 
profane space. The logic of modern sovereignty, then, is the logic 
of an instituted difference. The sovereign state establishes borders, 
that is, signs of difference from other profane states. The state is 
established through the consecration of a territory, its inhabitants, 
and their form of life.   
But this institution is guaranteed, within the conceptual 
structure of sovereignty, by openness to a secularized 
transcendence: that is, the transcendence of a sovereign subject 
who has been instituted as different among equals, as a supreme 
being in comparison with inferior others, but above all as the locus 
of the authority that transcends all concrete social relationships. 
This is an authority that relies on the conceptual model of 
subjectivity as the mask to which is attributed the unity of the 
institution as the reflex of the ideal unity of the multitude; and this 
applies to both the monarch’s mask and the people’s mask. Thus 
the secularized transcendence of sovereignty issues from the long-
term impersonality of the center of legal and political attribution in 
which it is embodied.  
The plenitudo potestatis, as potestas directa, is the 
technical outcome of this conceptual transcendence. More 
precisely, it is the form that the sovereign, as representative of 
                                                                                                             
20.   For a description of this concept, see CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR 
AGE (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2007). 
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unity, must acquire in order to make visible the empirically absent 
unity in the multitude. The peculiar potestas of the sovereign, 
being the acting representation of a subject who is one because he 
transcends all parties, all singularities, guarantees the transition 
from the fragmented multitude of the state of nature to the person-
multitude that is a people. Thus symbolically the sovereign must 
represent himself as an entity that tries to make immanent, by 
virtue of the absoluteness of his power and his decisions, what is in 
fact designed to remain transcendent: the pure ideal source of 
unity. The continuous attempt to render this ideal earthly is the 
regulatory principle of secularized transcendence as embodied in 
the modern concept of sovereignty. The process of secularization 
consists, then, of just this attempt, never totally successful, to bring 
unity to the world.21 But the attempt is conceptually destined to 
partly fail because that unity in se stands outside the world; it 
consists precisely of the perspective of the ideal standing above the 
material many.   
This dynamic helps account for the clear and deep traces of 
the pre-modern evident in the visible royal acts engaged in by 
several modern monarchies. At least until the French Revolution, 
the king could rely on the argument of the divine nature of his 
person, for example by pointing to his anointment at Reims; and 
this attitude was illustrated by his self-attribution of special powers 
(the Sun King proclaiming his own high and dazzling light). When 
Louis XIV said l’État c’est moi, he was expressing as well his 
awareness of being a material supreme subject who embodied the 
primacy of an authority beyond actual social relationships. 
Consistently with one strand of the Mediterranean legacy, and thus 
with the Eastern culture of political power, he affirmed a 
conception of the sovereign as directly containing the transcendent 
supremacy of an absolute center of power (direct representation). 
Sovereignty is embodied in the monarch’s body. We see here the 
attempt to delineate a subject that directly represents transcendence 
through the attempt to materialize ideal unity. This is not a third 
transcendent king evoked by the sovereign, but rather a presumed 
direct earthly-making of the unity in the king’s body.  
                                                                                                             
21.   See GIUSEPPE DUSO, LA LOGICA DEL POTERE. STORIA CONCETTUALE 
COME FILOSOFIA POLITICA (Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1999). 
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At the same time, however, sovereign power represents 
itself as articulating, under various configurations, the medieval 
theory of the king’s two bodies.22 The monarch’s physical body, 
which, like every body, is destined to suffer disease and decay, is 
associated with, and not distinguished from, the institutional and 
impersonal political body of a king who, as a power, as the center 
of the world, is immortal. The traditional formula adopted 
following the accession of a new sovereign, le Roi est mort, vive le 
Roi, is something like the emblem of the coexisting conception of 
secularized transcendence that seems to be largely associated, at 
least until the advent of the Byzantine Empire, with the Greek and 
Roman tradition of the impersonal nature of the supreme power.23 
As Ernst Jünger has written,24 this formula implies a third extra-
temporal king, and both the dead king and the living one are 
images of that king. They are like bodies that wear the mask of this 
third totally transcendent king who is the supreme center of 
attribution of legal, political, and social life within the state. Thus 
we have here, coexisting with the previous theory, a conception of 
the sovereign as strictly representing the supreme power and 
therefore as representing the original and transcendent source of 
absolute power (indirect representation). Indeed, the king’s 
physical death makes clear the impossibility of an immanent unity. 
The true sovereign is the third, extra-temporal, king and thus the 
indirect theory expresses the awareness of the irreducible distance 
between the physical unity of a person and the unity in a multitude. 
The latter is just an idea, but an idea with tremendous 
concreteness. This coexisting conception reminds us that the 
attempt to give unity earthly form is destined to fail; but this 
reference to unity as a third transcendent idea is understandable 
precisely because of the experience of many failures as part of the 
pretence of making unity earthly.  
                                                                                                             
22.   The best known overview of this theory is provided by ERNST H. 
KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957). 
23.   For a groundbreaking interpretation of the formula “Le roi est mort, 
vive le roi” see RALPH E. GIESEY, LE ROI NE MEURT JAMAIS: LES OBSÈQUES 
ROYALES DANS LA FRANCE DE LA RENAISSANCE (Flammarion, Paris, 1987). 
24.   See Ernst Jünger, Der gordische Knoten, in 7 SÄMTLICHE WERKE 
(Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1980) (1953). 
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The center of attribution that I have now referred to several 
times would appear to be, then, the conceptual condition for 
thinking about the social bond and unity-in-difference in a 
secularized context. As has been implied, the structure here 
described has remained substantially unchanged even within the 
conceptual model of popular sovereignty that begins with 
Rousseau’s theory of democracy, and even taking into account 
Rousseau’s notorious aversion to representative democracy. The 
twofold conception of secularized transcendence in modern 
sovereignty as simultaneously representing directly and 
representing indirectly supreme and absolute power is manifestly a 
Mediterranean legacy and the expression of a dialectic that enables 
the state to perform its regulatory function. This dialectic has, 
indeed, a normative nature, since it is what to a certain extent has 
allowed, until the present-day crisis of sovereignty, for the 
guarantee of a movement towards the impersonality and stability 
of the institution as a condition for the regulation of contingent 
aspects of social life.  
In fact, especially in the initial stages of the trajectory of 
change traced by the concept of sovereignty, the reference to the 
transcendent as embodied in the figure of the sovereign ensured 
that the project of a secularized unification received driving and 
legitimizing force. The unity of the supreme center implied the 
uniqueness of the source of law, with law viewed as the expression 
of the sovereign’s will, thereby guaranteeing the legitimization of 
positive law without structural reference to classical or explicitly 
theological forms of justification. Subsequently, the gradual 
unfolding of the process of secularization allowed for the 
emergence of an idea of transcendent sovereignty standing high 
above all other things: no longer embodied in the figure of the 
sovereign, but rather mainly represented in his person. In this way, 
the process of secularization gave rise to an idea more familiar to 
us, that of sovereignty as a supreme and depersonalized institution. 
What is really at issue in the Mediterranean legacy present in the 
concept of sovereignty, in the twofold form of conceptual 
transcendence that I have tried to describe, is the establishment of a 
dimension of institutional sovereignty, that is, the establishment of 
the impersonal legal-political condition for the unification of a 
secularized but not desacralized society. 
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On this reading, the present crisis of socio-legal unification 
found at the level of both states and supranational entities is also a 
kind of crisis of the very idea of conceptual transcendence that has 
been associated with the concept of sovereignty. In his celebrated 
introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes conceives of sovereignty as the 
artificial soul of the State, thereby implying it constitutes the 
immaterial core of supreme power. He seems also to have had 
clearly in mind the Mediterranean legacy that has been discussed 
in this paper, in particular as embodied in the Byzantine idea of the 
emperor as imitation of God. In Chapter XVII of Leviathan, 
Hobbes writes, after describing the social covenant: “This is the 
generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more 
reverently) of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the 
Immortal God, our peace and defence.”25 Thus, the Hobbesian 
covenant is also an act of faith. It expresses the rational process 
that leads subjects to have faith in their sovereign as the one able to 
protect them but also as the one who embodies, in his decisions 
and his representative actions, the unity of the state, the unity of 
the many. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Could there be something in the structure of secularized 
transcendence that we have no choice but to come to terms with if 
our aim is the socio-political unification of individuals in a context 
of pluralism and great diversity? Is the radical horizontality of 
institutional relationships found in the various contemporary 
models of governance really suited to the establishment of a social 
bond?  
On this score, it is worth remembering Immanuel Kant’s 
observations on the nature of the social contract. According to 
Kant, the indisputable practical reality of the social contract, as an 
idea of reason and as a keystone by which to measure the 
legitimacy of every public law, consists in the obligation on the 
                                                                                                             
25.   HOBBES, supra note 13, at 114; see ALOYSIUS P. MARTINICH, THE TWO 
GODS OF LEVIATHAN (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) (For an 
interesting interpretation, within Hobbesian studies, of the relationship between 
politics and transcendence). 
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legislator to enact laws in such a way that they could have been 
produced by the united will of a people.26  
But the united will of a people is not an empirical fact 
discernible through opinion polls, referenda, or elections. It is, 
rather, a rational ideal that can be concretely grasped in the form of 
the duty of civil union, the duty of life together regulated by law. 
The instantiation par excellence of the public good is the civil 
constitution of a social union that guarantees everyone freedom by 
means of laws. Thus the truly general interest of a polity is an a 
priori that precedes any recognition of consent. It is the idea that 
allows us to stay together, guaranteeing that nothing has been 
decided for a people if that same people could never have 
rationally reached the very same decision on its own. 
The general interest cannot, then, be the product of the 
aggregation of particular interests. The generality of the interest 
must be established and understood on a different level, one that 
transcends the logic of balance, of compromises, of negotiations. 
Indeed, without the assumption of a general interest so conceived, 
potential negotiations consistent with the democratic rule of law 
are not conceptually possible. Thus the general interest is the 
supreme investment in the salus publica; it is the investment in a 
regulated civil life that derives from a foundational and 
constitutional covenant. It coincides with the “prospect” of a 
(never totally) secularized transcendence embodied in the modern 
sovereignty of the people.    
Modern democracy, in the form of power of the people and 
government by the people symbolically conceived, finds a 
condition for its possibility in the conceivability of the general 
interest, because a people as a synthetic unity finds conceptual 
consistency precisely in the representative form of the general 
interest. From this perspective, a people should be conceived of as 
the rational outcome of a way of thinking of political unity that 
presupposes a multitude of subjects. This way of thinking unity 
seeks unceasingly to bring to reality, to make immanent, the unity 
and the existence of a people. We need only consider all the 
                                                                                                             
26.   See Immanuel Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie 
richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis, XXII BERLINER MONATSSCHRIFT, 
201 (Sept. 1793).  
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attempts to render the direct will of the people empirically visible 
through referenda and deliberation and the fact that these attempts 
never seem to pin down unity in a material way and make it 
possible to perceive a people as one sole thing.  
At the end of the day, what I hope can be grasped from the 
path pursued in this text is the pregnant historical-conceptual 
nature of the notion of sovereignty. Assuredly it is a modern 
concept, but within its structure of meaning a specific theoretical 
tradition about supreme political power has been absorbed and has 
evolved in line with modern conditions. The Mediterranean legacy 
bequeathed to the concept of sovereignty through the mutually 
enriching interactions between the Greek, Egyptian, and Persian 
cultures of power, and manifested in the mixture that constituted 
the principle of the topmost political subject in the Byzantine 
Empire, has clearly been incorporated into the founding ideas of 
political representation. In this model, representation always comes 
from the top, from the openness to transcendence that sacralizes 
the polity that constitutes representation. Modern political 
representation similarly comes from the top, from the ideal 
dimension of unity that cannot be discerned in the empirical 
multitude.  
The major modern difference resides in certain 
foundational assumptions about the representation of unity. In 
modernity, the rational foundation emerges from the bottom, from 
the convergent wills of rational agents, naturally equal, free, 
autonomous, and independent. But at the same time, since the sum 
of particular wills is different from the will of a people, and since 
the will of a unitarian people is the sole requirement for the 
modern legitimization of power, openness to a “conceptual top,” 
where the idea of unity is visible, becomes inescapable even for 
modernity. This bottom/top dialectic seems thus to capture the 
movement of the concept of sovereignty in modernity; but I would 
argue that this movement appears to have been triggered by the 
long and venerable tradition of political power in Mediterranean 
culture.  
 
